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 Abstract: This paper presents an empirical test of a subclass of poverty traps 
hypotheses.  The test is based on the observation that the nonconvexities in the 
production function necessary to generate multiple equilibria need only be 
present in the region between the equilibria.  Increasing returns should therefore 
be strongest when the economy is transitioning between steady states than when 
it is at or near one of those steady states.  I implement this idea by estimating the 
degree of increasing returns during growth accelerations and growth collapses 
for a panel of developing and developed economies using UNIDO's Database of 
Industrial Statistics.  I find no evidence of systematic differences in economies of 
scale between transition and non-transition episodes, shedding doubt on the idea 
that increasing returns in manufacturing generate poverty traps.  
1. Introduction 
 
There is a vast literature in the fields of economic development and growth 
that attempts to answer the question of why there exist such vast differences in 
output per worker and living standards across countries.  Explanations range 
from those that emphasize policy choices to those that center on deeper 
institutional and structural characteristics. A plethora of empirical studies 
evaluating these hypotheses has emerged in the cross-country context as well as 
in the tradition of in depth country- or region-specific case studies of economic 
growth. As would be natural to expect in such a broad and diverse literature, 
some of its main findings are hotly contested, making it possible to find 
advocates and detractors of almost all hypotheses that have been put forward.  
Furthermore, there are serious econometric criticisms that have been leveled at 
the cross-national regression approach, shedding doubt on the robustness and 
reliability of the conclusions that can be drawn from comparing growth rates 
across relatively diverse groups of economies. 
 
There is a distinct class of models of economic growth, however, which is 
much less amenable to evaluation in the cross-country regression framework and 
has therefore been the subject of a much more reduced literature.  This is the 
group of models characterized by the existence of multiple equilibria, or "poverty 
traps". In those models, the fundamental explanation for differences in per capita 
income is that some countries fall into self-reinforcing “vicious circles” in low 
levels of income are at once the result and the explanation.  For example, a poor 
country may be unable to collect enough taxes to finance infrastructure 
investment, while the lack of infrastructure may explain its low productivity and 
consequent low levels of average income.  Alternatively, a small, backward 
economy may not have the market size necessary to make a modern 
manufacturing sector profitable, but the lack of a modern manufacturing sector 
ensures that the economy remains backward.  By their nature, these models 
predict that two economies that may be identical in their fundamental 
determinants of living standards (quality of institutions, savings behavior, 
government policies)  may end up displaying very different levels of income , 
perhaps due to historical coincidences that led them to traverse different paths in 
the past.  
  This feature of poverty trap models – that otherwise identical countries 
may end up having very different trajectories in income – is also what limits the 
possibility of evaluating them in the standard cross-country framework.  The 
reason is that the workhorse regression in cross-national empirical studies of 
economic growth relies on a specification in which incomes or growth rates 
depend on fundamentals.  Since poverty trap models contend the opposite - that 
income does not depend on fundamentals – there is no direct relationship 
between the statistical significance of coefficients in a growth regression and the 
validity of the poverty traps hypothesis.  Furthermore, given that vicious cycles 
may well end up affecting the right-hand side variables in growth regressions (e.g.: a poor state is likely to provide low levels of public education) then these 
will be unlikely to satisfy the exogeneity conditions necessary for the coefficient 
estimates to be unbiased.
2  
 
Technically speaking, there are two different types of models of poverty traps 
in development economics. On the one hand, there are genuine models of 
multiple equilibria, in which at any given moment of time two economies with 
exactly the same parameters and the same historical evolution will have different 
levels of output per worker. In these models it is actually feasible for an economy 
to jump from being a rich economy to being a poor economy if agents suddenly 
become convinced that everyone else will pay the strategies leading to the 
inferior equilibrium.  On the other hand, there are models of multiple steady 
states.  In these models, two economies may share the same parameters but will 
end up in different long-run equilibria because they either had different starting 
conditions or faced a different evolution of shocks. 
 
Models of multiple steady states are best known and form part of the 
conventional textbook description of poverty traps.  For example, the 
conventional Solow model of economic growth can be modified by adding 
nonconvex regions to the production function, generating multiple long-run rest 
points in the resulting dynamical system.  Economies with different starting points 
will be in different basins of attraction and thus converge to different long-run 
steady states.  However, pure models of multiple equilibria are also common in 
the growth literature.  Perhaps the best known example comes from Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny's (1989) model of the "Big Push", in which firms decide to 
adopt modern production technologies characterized by increasing returns to 
scale only if they expect that demand will exist for their production, but this 
demand will only materialize if workers are being paid the wages that they can 
earn when they are working with modern production technologies.  In this model, 
it is sufficient for firms to expect that there will be demand for their products for 
them to decide to invest in the modern production technology, making their 
expectation a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 
Commonly, poverty-trap based explanations of underdevelopment 
emphasize the role of the manufacturing sector in the escape from poverty.
3  This 
is not only a prevalent assumption in the older development literature (Prebisch, 
1950, Rostow, 1961) but is also present in numerous modern models (Murphy, 
                                                 
2 This is of course a restatement of the endogeneity problem that has plagued cross-country 
regression work and which is not restricted to the subclass of poverty trap models.  While some 
credible attempts have been in the cross-country literature to attack this problem – mostly through 
the use of instrumental variables methods – their success implies at best that part of the variation 
in cross-country income or growth performance can be explained as a result of exogenous 
covariates, but does not invalidate the hypothesis that a large part of the remaining variation may 
be due to the existence of poverty traps. 
3Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989, p. 1003-4) write: "When domestic markets are small and 
world trade is not free and costless, firms may not be able to generate enough sales to make 
adoption of increasing returns profitable, and hence industrialization is stalled." Shleifer and Vishny, 1989, Matsuyama, 1991, Laitner, 2000). The emphasis on 
manufacturing is natural because manufacturing firms appear to be characterized 
by substantial setup costs and manufacturing environments appear to be better 
suited to the type of interactions that would generate learning externalities.  It is 
also commonplace to assume that development can only happen by 
industrialization, though this assertion is controversial.
4  It thus appears natural to 
study the prevalence of the mechanisms generating multiple equilibria in the 
manufacturing sector. 
 
Despite the difficulties for evaluating poverty trap models in a cross-country 
regression framework, a number of authors have attempted to evaluate poverty 
trap models using the cross-national data.  Not surprisingly, the interpretation of 
the evidence is very much under discussion.   Broadly speaking, there appear to 
be two types of empirical papers that attempt to evaluate models of poverty traps 
using the cross-country data.  On the one hand, there are studies that derive 
macroeconomic implications of poverty trap models for the evolution of economic 
growth over time and compare them with the patterns present in the data.   
Easterly (2006), Sachs et al. (2004), and Kraay and Raddatz (2005) are typical of 
this approach.  On the other hand, a second group of contributions studies the 
patterns of the cross-country distribution of income and compares it to what one 
would expect under both multiple equilibria and single equilibria models of 
growth.  Quah (1996), Azariadis and Stachurski (2004), and Bloom, Canning and 
Sevilla (2003) are examples of this second strand of research. The distinction 
between the two groups is not always airtight because it is difficult to talk about 
cross-country patterns of growth without talking about the emerging distribution.  
In that sense, the discussion is somewhat reminiscent of the debate between  β  
-convergence and  σ  -convergence advocates, although a full analysis of the 
relationship between both types of approaches has yet to be carried out. 
 
There is no conclusive pattern either of confirmation or rebuttal of poverty 
trap hypotheses that seems to emerge from these studies.  The key findings of 
the literature could be summarized as follows.  First, there are twin peaks in the 
world income distribution, either unconditionally (Quah, 1996 Azariadis and 
Stachurski, 2004) or conditional on geographic factors (Bloom, Canning and 
Sevilla, 2003). This observation is consistent with the idea of multiple steady 
states, though it could also be generated by single equilibria models combined 
with a bimodal distribution either of the disturbances or of the explanatory 
variables. Some poor countries have grown at very low rates, in contrast to rich 
countries that have grown very rapidly (Sachs et al., 2004). However, there is 
little evidence of a savings-induced poverty trap at the macro-level since very 
poor countries have not had very low savings rates (Easterly, 2006, Kraay and 
Raddatz, 2005). There are plenty of transitions between poor and rich countries, 
and most of them don't occur through growth accelerations. If one does a horse 
race between policies and initial poverty, one finds that the bad policies 
                                                 
4See Lederman and Maloney (2007). 
 explanation has more power (Easterly, 2006). 
 
Part of the inconclusiveness has to do with the fact that different authors 
adopt different splits for the data.  For example, Easterly (2006) and Sachs et al. 
(2004) adopt different definitions of the relevant set of poor countries in order to 
distinguish whether they grow more slowly than the rest of the economy.   
However, the deeper problem appears to be that a number of patterns (such as 
the bimodality in the data) are consistent with multiple equilibria as well as with 
other hypotheses.  Therefore it is necessary to come up with tests that break the 
observational equivalence between multiple equilibrium and single equilibria 
model. 
 
The basic idea of this paper starts out from the observation - first made by 
Cooper and John (1988) that multiple equilibria require positive spillovers.  These 
spillovers can occur at the level of many strategic interactions among agents: 
production, savings, or fertility decisions. They also imply the existence of some 
type of scale economies at the national level. This is because the fact that the 
payoff to one agent is positively related to the other agent's action implies that if 
both agents undertake an action their joint payoff must be higher than an agent's 
individual payoff if no one else takes that action. 
 
As we show, the Cooper and John results effectively require the existence 
of positive spillovers only in the region between equilibria, but not at or near the 
equilibria themselves. This is the basis for our empirical strategy: to separately 
estimate the degree of increasing returns for countries that appear to be 
transitioning between equilibria - either because they are growing or declining 
very rapidly.  If the poverty traps explanation of underdevelopment were correct, 
these countries should be the most stringent candidates for examples of 
transitions between equilibria.  If these countries are effectively transitioning 
between equilibria, then we should be able to find evidence that positive 
spillovers are stronger among them than in the rest of the sample. 
 
  The intuition for our approach can be illustrated by going back to the 
Murphyh, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) model of manufacturing and increasing 
returns.  As the economy transitions from being traditional to being modern, we 
find that firms in the modern manufacturing sector are becoming more profitable 
at the same time that they are expanding, as the growth in the economy’s market 
size makes them increasingly capable of recouping their fixed costs.  Thus, if we 
were to study the economy during this transition, we would find evidence of 
economy-wide scale economies.  Similarly, if the economy enters into a growth 
collapse – whereby the shrinking size of the economy makes it more difficult for 
firms to cover their fixed costs, then we will also find that firms are becoming less 
profitable as they are shrinking, again providing evidence of economy-wide scale 
economies.  But if, in contrast, we were to study the economy at any of its long-
run equilibria (either in its traditional or modernized state) then we would find no relationship between the economy’s aggregate size and the profitability of firms.
5  
This idea can be used to evaluate the existence of poverty traps in a 
number of models.  As long as we can produce estimates of positive spillovers in 
any dimension, we can evaluate whether the magnitude of these spillovers is 
greater in countries that are experiencing very high or very low growth rates.  In 
order to obtain a precise definition of what a very high or very low growth rate is, 
we borrow from the recent literature on growth transitions.
6  In this paper we 
illustrate this idea by centering on one of the channels for positive spillovers most 
prevalent in the poverty traps literature: the presence of increasing returns in the 
manufacturing sector.  Using UNIDO's Database of Industrial Statistics, we will 
estimate manufacturing production functions for 44 countries and test whether 
they are systematically different in countries undergoing growth collapses and 
growth accelerations.  
One important caveat about our paper is that, since our data set covers only 
the manufacturing sector, we are able to evaluate only manufacturing-based 
versions of the poverty trap hypothesis.  To the best of our knowledge, there is 
no comparable cross-national database that allows us to implement our 
approach in services or agriculture.  Nevertheless, as we have already argued, a 
large number of multiple equilibria models of underdevelopment emphasize 
precisely the significance of externalities in manufacturing during the process of 
an economy’s modernization.  It is also the case that our method can be 
extender to the study of savings rates, fiscal policy, and other potential 
determinants of positive spillovers. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theory of 
positive spillovers behind the empirical strategy. Section 3 introduces the 
industry-level data and presents our estimation results.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  The Theory of Positive Spillovers and Testing for Multiple Equilibria 
 
All models of poverty traps have essentially the same underlying story. 
Agents in an economy are trapped in a situation in which their actions generate a 
situation of low income/productivity and at the same time the economy's low level 
of income has the consequence of generating incentives for agents not to 
change their actions.  If all agents in an economy could coordinate to change 
their actions to those that will generate high levels of income, then they would 
find it rational to do so.  But they will find it rational to undertake the action with 
virtuous consequences only if everyone else does so; otherwise their incentive 
will be to take the action that produces low levels of income. 
 
This general story covers many potential mechanisms of poverty traps.   
                                                 
5 A distinction must be drawn in this example between internal firm economies (which are present 
in the modernized equilibrium but not in the traditional one) and economy-wide external effects,  It 
is the latter, not the former, which generate multiple equilibria.  However, in the version of the 
Solow model that we use for our empirical tests, it becomes unnecessary to make this distinction. 
6 See, for example, Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005), Cerra and Saxena (2005), Reddy 
and Minoiu (2007), Hausmann, Rodríguez and Wagner (2008). Firms may find it optimal to adopt expensive, high productivity technologies only 
if everyone else does so.  Individuals may be willing and able to save only if they 
are above their subsistence level of income, something that will only occur if 
everyone else saves enough so as to finance high levels of capital accumulation.  
The average family in a poor country will tend to decide to have many children, 
but a high population growth rate makes it difficult for the economy to accumulate 
a sufficient stock of productive assets per worker, thus keeping the economy 
poor. 
In all of these explanations, there exists a feedback mechanism from 
collective decisions to the incentives of a particular agent. A firm will decide 
whether to adopt a technology not only based on its technical productivity but 
also on the level of aggregate demand in the economy. An individual will decide 
to save more or to have fewer children only if her income is sufficiently high, and 
this will happen only if the economy has a sufficiently high stock of capital per 
worker. 
 
In a classic paper, Russell Cooper and Andrew John (1988) identified the key 
causal link in all of these explanations as the existence of strategic 
complementarities combined with positive spillovers.  Broadly speaking, positive 
spillovers exist whenever there is an action that, if it is undertaken by all other 
agents, will generate an overall superior situation for the remaining agent, while a 
strategic complementarily exists when the private benefit of undertaking an 
action is higher for each individual when other individuals are undertaking it.   
More formally, suppose that there exist  N  agents, which we index by   N i ... 1 =  .  
Let   ) , ( e e V i   denote the payoff to agent  i  from carrying out action  ei  if all other 
agents are carrying out action   e  .  There will be a positive spillover when 
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that is, each individual benefits from all other individuals increasing their level of  
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that is, the marginal payoff to agent  i  from increasing her action  ei  must 
increase when everyone increases that action. Cooper and John's key results are 
that (i) A strategic complementarily is a necessary condition for multiple 
equilibria, and (ii) These equilibria can be Pareto-ranked by the equilibrium action 
if there are positive spillovers.  Precisely when this happens can we talk about 
the existence of poverty traps: equilibria in which the reinforcing decision (not) to 
take a particular action generates an outcome in which all agents are worse off. 
 
A commonly overlooked fact about the Cooper and John results is that the requirement of positive spillovers is local to the range between the two equilibria.  
In other words, suppose that equilibrium 1 (the poverty trap) is characterized by a 
level of action  e′  while equilibrium 2 is characterized by action   e e ′ > ′ ′  .  In that 
case, the positive spillover condition   0 ) ( , 2 > e e V i   need only occur for the range  
] , [ e e e ′ ′ ′ ∈  .  Positive spillovers may be absent for   e e ′ <   or   e e ′ ′ >  .
7   
This observation forms the basis for our empirical strategy, as it implies 
that one should only expect to find economies of scale in the range between 
equilibria or, in other words, when the economy is transitioning either into or out 
of a poverty trap.  As stated, the Cooper and John model places no restriction on 
the level of scale economies when the economy is at either of the equilibria. 
These requirements are actually even stronger in many of the relevant 
models of economic growth characterized by multiple steady states, where it is 
necessary for positive spillovers to be present only in the region between the 
steady states.  In order to show this, we set up a simple Solow-style model 
characterized by increasing returns.  Let an individual firm's production function 
be given by: 
 
) ( ) ( it t it k f k A y =         ( 3 )  
 
where   N
k n
i t
it k ∑ = =1  .The first part of the production function captures the feedback 
from the aggregate capital stock to an individual firm's productivity, whereas the 
second part encapsulates the private part of the firm's payoffs which depend only 
on its actions. We say that there are positive spillovers when   0 > ′ A   Assuming 
that there is a symmetric equilibrium in which all identical firms take the same 
production decision, we can define the GDP function: 
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for   ) ( ) ( 1 t
N
i t k f k g ∑ = =  .Let us suppose that capital accumulation in the economy is 
given by the simple Solow closure: 
 
t t t t k n sy k k ) ( 1 δ + − = − +        ( 5 )  
 
In this case the steady state will be the level of capital stock such that: 
.
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7This follows from Proposition 4 of Cooper and John (1988), which uses the positive slope of the 
derivative of the outcome function over the range between the equilibria.  Therefore the presence 
- or lack thereof - of positive spillovers in this range is irrelevant. 
 
 In order for this economy to have several steady states, this equation must 
have more than one solution. Let us concentrate on the two steady states 
corresponding to the lowest and highest levels of  kt  respectively labeled  k  and  
k  .  Note that it is necessary for the model to be minimally consistent with reality 
for both of these equilibria to be stable: otherwise, the model would imply that if 
the capital stock was to fall below  k  (increase above   k  ), it would decline 
(grow) without bounds.  Mathematically, this implies that: 
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Since   ) ( ) ( k h k h =   then it must also be the case that the average 
derivative between  k  and   k   is zero: 
 
0 ) ( = ′ ∫ dk k h
k
k         ( 8 )  
 
Note that the definitions of  k  and   k   imply: 
 
k k k h k h
k k k h k h
> <
< >
for    ) ( ) (
for    ) ( ) (
       ( 9 )  
 
With the implication that: 
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Expressions (8)-(11) imply that the average value of  h′  is higher in the range  
] , [ k k   than outside this range. In order to get a more concrete idea of the 
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where   A
k A
Ak
′ = ε  , the elasticity of productivity with respect to the capital stock.  
Now (7) and (8) imply that there must be a   ( ∈ k   k ,  ) k   for which   0 ) ( > ′ k h   and, 
by (13),  0 1 > − > α ε Ak  . So there must be a range over which the function has 
increasing returns.  Furthermore, (8) also implies that the output-weighted 
elasticity must be greater than  ( )y ˆ 1 − α  , with 
κ
κ γˆ = dk ∫Α
α κ   denoting the average 
level of income in the range between  k  and   k  .  This requires again that   Ak ε   
be positive over part of this range, implying the existence of economies of scale.  
However, no such implication is true for the ranges   ] , 0 [ k   and   ] , [ ∞ k  , where 
(10) and (11) are consistent with   0 ≤ Ak ε  .  Furthermore, manipulating these 
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In other words, the (value-weighted) elasticity of productivity with respect 
to the capital stock must be equal to 1- α   in the range  [ k , ] k  , but must strictly 
less than this value in the ranges   ] , 0 [ k   and   ]. , [ ∞ k    If we assume that   Ak ε   is 
equal to constants  em  ,  el  and  eh   respectively in these three ranges, then the 
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In sum, the degree of increasing returns must be greater in the range between 
the lowest and highest level stable equilibria.  It is important to note that the degree of increasing returns must be high both when the economy is going from 
being a poor to being a rich country (a growth acceleration) and when it is going 
from being a rich to being a poor country (a growth collapse), as in both cases 
there is a positive relationship between the size of the economy and the marginal 
private return to capital accumulation 
 
This result provides us with a mechanism that can be used to test for the 
existence of multiple equilibria.  The idea is to identify situations in which we 
suspect that the economy may be in the range between[ k , ] k . If we estimate  
Ak ε   in this range, we should get values which are on average higher than 
outside of that range (or than locally at any of the extreme
8).  Although we have 
illustrated this in the context of a simple Solow-style growth model, the general 
framework can be extended to many other mechanisms that generate multiple 
equilibria in growth models, such as subsistence consumption or endogenous 
fertility. 
 
3.  Evidence from Manufacturing 
 
In this section we follow up on the results presented in the previous section 
by investigating the evidence of systematic differences in the magnitude of 
external effects in different regions of the production function. Our tests rely on 
the idea that, if poverty traps were the fundamental explanation behind the vast 
differences of income per capita across countries, then the periods during which 
the economy is transitioning between different steady states should correspond 
to either growth accelerations or growth collapses.  But, according to the results 
of the previous section, the magnitude of the external effects present in these 
economies should also be systematically different in these periods in contrast of 
periods during which an economy is not transitioning between steady states. 
 
Our empirical strategy is thus based on the following idea: First, we identify 
the periods of growth transitions.  These are the periods during which an 
economy appears to have fallen into a poverty trap or to have escaped from it.  
We can identify these periods because when an economy is transitioning from a 
lower-level (upper-level) steady state to an upper-level (lower-level) one we 
should observe a growth rate that is systematically different from that which we 
observe when the economy is at or near one of the steady states.  Second, we 
separately estimate the aggregate production function for the countries in our 
data set and evaluate whether it is systematically different during these periods 
of growth transitions than during the rest of the sample. 
 
Our identification of growth transitions is done using data on PPP-adjusted 
per capita and per worker output from the Penn World Tables 6.2 data set.  If an 
                                                 
8Note that (7) implies that at any local small interval around k  and  k  ,   α ε − <1 Ak   
 
 economy is close to its steady state, we should expect it to be growing at 
approximately the rate of world technological progress, which we shall call  x .   
We define a threshold difference in the growth rate    such that we will consider 
an economy growth acceleration if two conditions are held: (i) its growth rate 
exceeds   δ + x   on average over a five year period, and (ii) its growth rate 
exceeds   x  on every single year of this five year period.  Similarly, we define a 
growth collapse as a five year period during which (i) the growth rate is less than  
δ − x   on average during a five year period, and (ii) the growth rate is less than  
x  on every single year of that five-year period. 
 
In the following empirical exercise, we set   2 = =δ x  .  The first of these 
finds a basis in a number of analyses of long-run economic growth, which have 
argued that the long-run rate of technological progress can be adequately proxy 
by the long-run growth rate of the US economy, which is approximately two 
percent (e.g., Parente and Prescott, 2000).  The assumption that   2 = δ   has the 
convenient feature of being the only symmetric assumption that also identifies as 
growth collapses only those episodes associated with negative economic growth.  
This implies that our episodes of growth collapses will coincide with the episodes 
of length greater than five years identified by Hausmann, Rodríguez and Wagner 
(2008).  Our filter for accelerations is different from that used by Hausmann, 
Rodrik, and Pritchett (2008), though, since these authors emphasize any 
significant positive changes in the growth rate, while we are most interested in 
those changes that are consistent with the economy moving away from a steady 
state. 
 
We generate these growth transitions using both Real GDP per Capita 
and Real GDP per Worker from the Penn World Tables data. In the per capita 
metric, 11.6% of country-years correspond to growth accelerations while 10.9% 
correspond to growth collapses.  Using the per-worker metric, the corresponding 
figures are 9.9 and 11.9 percent.  This is due to the fact that for most of the 
sample the growth in the labor force is higher than that of population growth, 
making it more difficult to meet a pre-specified growth threshold (and easier to 
fall below a collapse threshold) when one uses the per worker metric. The four 
countries spending the highest amount of time in a growth acceleration (using the 
per capita metric) coincide with the well-known cases of growth accelerations 
that appear to be the strongest candidates for a story of “escape from a poverty 
trap."  These are Korea (43 years), Taiwan (40 years), Thailand (32 years), and 
Malaysia (30 years).  Similarly, the four top places for period of time undergoing 
a growth collapse go to well-known basket cases such as Madagascar (40 
years), Kuwait (26 years), Jordan (25 years) and Ecuador, Brunei and Kenya 
(each with 24 years). 
 
We now turn to examining whether the countries undergoing these 
transitions display greater evidence of economies of scale in the microeconomic 
data.  We will estimate these economies of scale using data from industrial surveys covering the manufacturing sector from the Industrial Statistics Database 
produced by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 
2005).  This institution currently collects yearly country-level data on industrial 
aggregates by industry for 181 countries. This effort, which started in 1977, has 
allowed the construction of a data set that goes back to 1963 for the 3-Digit ISIC 
Revision 2 classification. The data is collected through annual questionnaires 
that are sent to the statistical offices of countries with an industrial level survey or 
census. The data is then checked for consistency and errors by UNIDO and 
supplemented with national and international statistical sources as well as data 
collected by statisticians engaged by UNIDO to work in specific countries. The 
statistical checks are designed to ensure cross-national comparability: as stated 
by UNIDO (2003), this database is primarily intended to meet the statistical 
needs of researchers engaged in international, or cross-country, studies rather 
than country-specific investigations. (p. 3) 
 
Since our data contains industry-level aggregates - as opposed to firm-
level information - separately identifying the spillover effect from the aggregate 
characteristics of the production function can be difficult.  Ideally, one would like 
to be able to gauge the responsiveness of firm-level production to aggregate 
production.  However, this is not strictly necessary to test the hypotheses 
presented in the previous section.  To see why this is the case, note that in the 
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Note that this is the same as the value inside the parentheses in (13) 
(minus one).  In other words, what matters for the generation of a poverty trap is 
the concavity/convexity of the aggregate production function   ) (k y  , not how it is 
divided between   ) (k A   and   ) (k g  . 
 
The stylized description that we have presented has relied on the 
existence of a spillover effect in the capital stock.  More generally, the production 
function could be characterized by increasing returns in both capital and labor.  A 
standard description would be: 
 
. log log log log 0 t l k A y it it i it γ β α + + + =       ( 2 0 )  
 
It is common at least since Nerlove (1963) to estimate the dual of this 
problem, which is given by the associated cost minimization problem.  Given a 
production technology as described in (20), it is straightforward to derive the 









B C it it it i it
γ β α
− + + + = ln ln ln
1
ln log 0      ( 2 1 )  
 
where   β α + = s   is a measure of returns to scale (in what follows we use the 
convention of reporting   1 − = ′ s s  ). Substituting   s s








B r C it it it i it it
γ β
− + + = / ln ln
1
ln / log 0      ( 2 2 )  
 
Our key hypothesis, derived in (17) is that the degree of increasing returns 
in the production function (given by  s  in (22) will be higher during growth 
transitions than during growth accelerations. In principle, we could test this by 
evaluating whether these parameters change considerably during a growth 
transition: 
 
{ } it it it i it y i t y c log ~ log log log log 4 3 2 1 0 Τ ∈ Ι + + + + Β = θ θ ω θ θ  (23) 
 
where we would test the hypothesis that  
4 1 1
1 1
θ θ θ + <  . Alternatively, we can 
distinguish between growth accelerations and growth collapses, thus estimating: 
 
{ } { } it C it it it i it y i y i t y c log log ~ log log log log 5 4 3 2 1 0 Τ ∈ Ι + Τ ∈ Ι + + + + Β = Α θ θ θ ω θ θ   
                    ( 2 4 )  
 
and testing  
1 4 1
1 1
θ θ θ > +  ,   .
1 5 1
1 1
θ θ θ > +   
 
In estimating a cost function using cross-national data, it is important to 
take into account that countries may be producing below their potential output 
because of institutional, policy, or other country-specific inefficiencies. These 
inefficiencies may generate the illusion of non-convexities in the production 
technology which are in effect due to the fact that some countries are well below 
their actual productive capacity.  As our interest in this paper lies in 
understanding whether the production technology is characterized by increasing 
returns in the neighborhood of growth transitions ( and not whether poverty traps 
operate through more complex institutional channels), it is important for us to 
model these inefficiencies explicitly.  In order to do so, we adopt a stochastic 
production frontier specification as proposed by Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).  
In essence, we model the production function as containing an asymmetric 
inefficiency term: 
 
it it it i it t l k A y ξ γ β α + + + + = log log log log 0     (25) 
 
with   0 < it ξ  .  Kumbhakar and Lovell shows that this assumption leads to an 
econometric cost function specification with two disturbance terms:  
it it it it it u v t y c + + + + + = 3 2 1 0
~ ln ln log θ ω θ θ θ     (26) 
 
with   0 ≥ it u  .  This model can be estimated via maximum likelihood methods. 
 
In order to estimate these equations using the UNIDO data we will need 
data on factor cost, employment and the capital stock.  The UNIDO database has 
aggregate payments to capital and labor as well as employment and nominal 
gross fixed capital formation by three-digit sector. The UNIDO database also has 
three-digit sector production indices which we can use to derive sector-specific 
output deflators.  We convert factor costs to real terms using these deflators. 
However, the generation of real investment is more difficult as we do not have 
investment deflators in the UNIDO data.  As an investment deflator, we use the 
domestic price of investment from the Penn World Tables data.  After deflating 
the investment level, we then build perpetual inventory capital stock estimates, 
using a depreciation rate of 4 percent and an initial capital stock estimate equal 
to three times value added (measured in terms of investment goods) in the initial 
year of the data.  We derive  r   as the average operating surplus divided by the 
estimated capital stock, and  w  as the average employee compensation divided 
by the total number of employees. Regrettably, only 44 countries have sufficient 
data to allow us to estimate all of these variables.  However, as shown in 
Appendix Table 1, the list of countries is sufficiently heterogeneous, including 19 
developed countries and 25 developing countries.  Of the developing countries, 
seven are in Latin America, six in the Middle East and North Africa, six in Asia, 
four in Eastern Europe, and two in sub-Saharan Africa. In the per-worker metric, 
21.8% of country-years in our sample are undergoing growth accelerations, while 
14.1% correspond to growth collapses. 
 
It is also worth noting that our sample is composed primarily of economies 
in which the manufacturing sector is important.  This fact can be seen in 
Appendix Table 1, which shows that the average share of manufacturing exports 
as a percentage of total exports in our sample is 53.35 (as opposed to 36 percent 
for all countries in the World Development Indicators).  This is of course a 
reflection of the fact that it is precisely in countries where manufacturing is more 
important that we are likely to have enough data to carry out our calculations. At 
the same time, if we were to find evidence of a manufacturing-based poverty 
trap, we would expect it to be strongest precisely in this subset of countries. 
 
Table 1 shows the results of our estimates of the cost function using the 
UNIDO dataset, with each observation corresponding to the manufacturing 
sector of country  i  at time  t .  Therefore these estimates should be considered 
aggregate estimates of the manufacturing production function.  We start out with 
the simple dual cost specification in (22) and augment it with interactions with 
growth transitions and for growth collapses and accelerations separately as in 
(23) and (24).  We control for country-specific fixed effects to capture country-
specific heterogeneity.  Column 1 shows the effect of estimating (22), without drawing a distinction between countries according to whether they are 
experiencing a transition.  We estimate   317 . = ′ s  , indicating strong evidence of 
increasing returns to scale in the sample as a whole.  However, when we include 
the interaction between output and growth transitions, our estimate for 
economies undergoing a transition is   316 . =
′
t s  , very close to the one for non-
transition economies of   324 . =
′
nt s   (column 2 - sub indices  nt , a , g , and  c  
denote respectively no transition, transition, acceleration and collapse).  Once we 
distinguish between growth collapses and growth accelerations we get   438 . =
′
c s  
, which is significantly higher than   363 . =
′
nt s   and   307 . =
′
a s  .  Note that the 
pattern of coefficients that emerges is somewhat surprising.  Remember form the 
previous section that the degree of increasing returns should increase both 
during growth collapses and during growth accelerations.  If there is evidence 
that the degree of returns to scale increase during a growth transition, this 
appears to be happening only under growth collapses.  The degree of scale 
economies under growth accelerations actually appears to be lower than that in 
no transition economies.  The coefficient on growth collapses is, however, not 
statistically different from the one on non-transition episodes - although the one 
on growth accelerations is significantly lower.  This result sheds doubt on the 
idea that we can understand growth miracles as occurring because countries are 
able to escape from a poverty trap. 
 
Broadly similar results emerge from the use of the definitions of growth 
collapse and accelerations in per worker terms.  Remember that this specification 
arguably captures more adequately the spirit of the aggregate production 
function as a measure of productive efficiency.  The significant difference that 
emerges in this specification is that the estimate of returns to scale during growth 
collapses   478 =
′
c s   is now significantly higher at 1% than that on non-transition 
episodes ( ) 370 . =
′
n s as well than those on growth accelerations ( ) 321 . =
′
a s  . The 
evidence thus could support the hypothesis that countries that are collapsing are 
falling into poverty traps. 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the stochastic frontier estimates.  It is 
interesting to notice that the key results are unaltered in this more sophisticated 
estimation exercise. The estimate of returns to scale on the whole sample is   
291 . = ′ s  , only slightly lower than the one presented in Table 1.  Again, there is 
no significant pattern of differences in returns to scale between transitions and 
non-transitions considered as a whole, but when the latter are split between 
collapses and accelerations, we find a significantly higher degree of scale 
economies in growth collapses than in non-transitions, and a significantly lower 
degree in growth accelerations. 
 
The exercise presented in the previous tables assumes the existence of 
an aggregate production function for manufacturing which maps the inputs of the 
whole sector into aggregate output.  It also assumes that the nonconvexities or external effects driving increasing returns are present in manufacturing as a 
whole. Either of these assumptions may be wrong: sector-specific production 
functions may not easily aggregate into a manufacturing-level production function 
and increasing returns may operate at the sector level but not necessarily at the 
aggregate level.  Therefore, in Table 3 we proceed to estimate the degree of 
increasing returns separately for each one of the 28 3-digit sectors for which the 
UNIDO database has sufficient data. 
 
In our baseline estimation, all manufacturing sectors are characterized by 
statistically significant increasing returns, with a minimum level for  s′  of .114 
(plastics) and a maximum of 1.791 (printing). At a sector level, the average value 
of  
′
nt s   is  .636 , while the median value is .594. On average, sectors in countries 
undergoing transitions actually have lower economies of scale parameter.  In 10 
of the 28 sectors, this parameter is significantly lower, for transitions while in the 
remaining 18 sectors, the difference is not statistically significant.  When we allow 
the interactions on collapse and acceleration episodes to differ, we get a majority 
of sectors (24 out of 28) displaying a lower degree of scale economies than in the 
non-transition episodes.  In 16 of these 24 cases, the difference is statistically 
significant, with a change in scale economies ( 061 . − = −
′ ′
nt a s s  ) similar to those 
found in the aggregate estimations.  In the case of collapses, the pattern is less 
strong, with 18 out of 28 sectors presenting greater economies of scale than in 
the baseline sectors. The results are somewhat stronger again when we use the 
arguably superior per-worker metric: here the degree of scale economies 
increases in 21 out of 28 sectors during the collapse cases, (13 of them 
significantly so) while they decrease in 25 of the 28 cases for growth 
accelerations (17 significant). 
 
The pattern of these differences is illustrated in Figure 1, where we plot 
density estimates for the differences between collapse and acceleration 
episodes, on the one side, and non-transition episodes, on the other.  While 
close inspection of the figure does reveal that the densities for accelerations 
appear to fall more to the left than those of collapse episodes, what is striking 
about these figures is the fact that the densities appear not to be very dissimilar, 
with a large fraction of sectors falling in regions in which there is no substantial 
difference between the degree of scale economies in transitions and those in 
accelerations. 
 
The results of this section thus do not give strong support to the hypothesis 
that growth transitions occur as a result of countries moving between different 
equilibria.  There appears to be no overwhelming evidence that the form of the 
production function changes systematically in the direction of more convexity 
during growth transitions.  Some of our estimates give tentative evidence that 
may be consistent with the poverty traps hypothesis for growth collapses. 
 
4. Conclusions  
This paper has presented a simple idea for evaluating the relevance of 
poverty trap explanations for the development process. The idea relies on the 
observation that if positive spillovers are the basis for multiple equlibria, then 
these spillovers should be particularly prevalent when countries are transitioning 
either into or out of poverty traps.  Thus we should find that the spillovers are 
strong souring periods of growth collapses and growth accelerations - at least if 
these collapses and accelerations can be explained as transitions into and out of 
poverty traps. 
 
Our idea can be applied to any estimate of the positive spillovers generating 
multiple equilibria.  We illustrate our method by estimating economies of scale in 
manufacturing using data from UNIDO's Industrial Statistics Database.  For a 
sample of 44 countries that is evenly balanced between developed and 
developing economies, we find no significant evidence that growth transitions are 
systematically different from non-transition episodes in terms of the level of 
increasing returns present in the manufacturing production functions.  Once we 
split the sample between growth collapses and growth accelerations, we do find 
that on average growth collapse experiences appear to show a higher degree of 
scale economies than non-transition episodes.  
Our exercise suggests that scale economies may have had something to do 
with the growth collapses of economies in our database such as Bolivia, Iran and 
Kenya. We find evidence that this group of countries shows increased 
nonconvexities in their transition from higher to lower levels of income, 
suggesting that they may have entered a self-reinforcing cycle whereby initial 
declines of income translate into further declines in productivity.    On the other 
hand, we do not find evidence that scale economies in manufacturing were any 
more prevalent in countries undergoing growth accelerations, such as Chile, 
Korea, and Singapore.  This suggests that the manufacturing-based increasing 
returns explanation for these growth miracles is not consistent with the data.   
However, the hypothesis that increasing returns in other sectors, such as 
agriculture, may have been behind these growth miracles, is still a possible 
explanation.
9  
There are many other channels aside from increasing returns in 
manufacturing that can generate poverty traps in development, and we have 
evaluated just one of them.   Thus our results should not be interpreted as 
disproving the idea of poverty traps.  That said, we have evaluated an idea that is 
central to much of the development literature: that taking advantage of increasing 
returns in manufacturing is a key mechanism through which development 
happens.  While our estimates do find a significant level of increasing returns in 
manufacturing, we do not find that these scale economies are more prevalent in 
the countries that are experiencing growth accelerations.  An obvious direction 
for future research consists in evaluating the prevalence of alternative positive 
spillover mechanisms in growth transitions.  
                                                 
9 See Sachs and Woo (1999) for an explanation of China’s growth miracle that attributes a central 
role to productivity gains in agriculture.  
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Dependent Variable: ln(Cost/r) (1)              (2)              (3)              (4)              (5)                      
w/r 0.4641 0.4657 0.4527 0.4655 0.448
(0.0416)** (0.0420)** (0.0439)** (0.0415)** (0.0426)***
Output 0.7595 0.7552 0.7335 0.7709 0.7301
(0.0316)** (0.0345)** (0.0355)** (0.0353)** (0.0355)***
Trend 0.0046 0.0048 0.0053 0.0044 0.0052
(0.0015)** (0.0015)** (0.0016)** (0.0016)** (0.0016)***
Growth Transitions -0.0904 0.3747
(0.2281)     (0.2291)    
Transitions*output 0.0048 -0.0136
(0.0093)     (0.0093)    
Growth Collapses 0.9747 1.4202
(0.5312)* (0.3686)***






Constant -7.4857 -7.8686 -8.1216 -7.3147 -7.7946
(2.3391)** (2.4130)** (2.4453)** (2.4174)** (2.4357)***
Observations 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280
Number of countries 44 44 44 44 44
R-squared 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83
Returns to Scale








Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Per Capita Collapses Per Worker Collapses
 Table 2: Stochastic Frontier Panel Estimation
Dependent Variable: ln(Cost) (1)               (2)               (3)               (4)               (5)              
ln(wage) 0.4683 0.47 0.4582 0.4696 0.4538
(0.0130)*** (0.0130)*** (0.0133)*** (0.0129)*** (0.0130)***
Output 0.7747 0.7716 0.7555 0.785 0.7546
(0.0213)*** (0.0223)*** (0.0228)*** (0.0222)*** (0.0230)***
Trend 0.0039 0.0041 0.0044 0.0038 0.0042
(0.0011)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0011)***




Growth Collapses 0.9479 1.3847
(0.4267)** (0.3478)***






Constant -8.4991 -8.8062 -8.7798 -8.4026 -8.3533
(1.8914)*** (1.8992)*** (1.8797)*** (1.9005)*** (1.8516)***
Observations 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280
Number of countries 44 44 44 44 44
R-squared
Returns to Scale








Per Capita Collapses Per Worker Collapses














Median 0.594 0.509 -0.032 0.564 0.526 0.031 0.503 -0.061 0.581 0.513 -0.017 0.559 0.596 0.090 0.513 -0.063
Mean 0.636 0.615 -0.021 0.674 0.599 -0.075 0.597 -0.078 0.654 0.600 -0.054 0.716 0.673 -0.043 0.572 -0.144
Minimum 0.114 0.114 -0.292 0.133 -2.698 -4.300 0.101 -0.501 0.115 0.109 -0.350 0.140 -1.901 -3.829 0.103 -0.724
Maximum 1.791 2.337 0.959 1.953 2.242 0.942 2.271 0.669 1.805 1.669 0.100 2.037 2.414 0.412 1.588 0.043
5th percentile 0.218 0.185 -0.183 0.222 0.167 -0.254 0.157 -0.366 0.215 0.191 -0.282 0.222 0.152 -0.192 0.140 -0.455
95th percentile 1.378 1.608 0.032 1.602 1.996 0.309 1.586 0.044 1.791 1.523 0.048 1.928 1.444 0.376 1.555 0.031
Positive 28 28 7 28 27 18 28 4 28 28 11 28 27 21 28 3
Poistive and Significant 28 28 0 28 27 5 28 0 28 28 2 28 26 13 28 0
Negative 0 0 21 0 1 10 0 24 0 0 17 0 1 7 0 25
Negative and Significant 0 0 10 0 0 3 0 16 0 0 8 0 1 4 0 17
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Figure 1:Changes in Scale Economies During TransitionsAppendix Table 1: Composition of UNIDO Sample
Country Initial Year Final Year Number of Years
Manufacturing Exports 
as % of Total Exports*
Manufacturing Value 
Added as % of GDP*
Australia 1963 2001 37 21.62% 13.66%
Austria 1969 2000 31 83.13% 21.28%
Belgium 1963 1999 35 80.28% 18.85%
Bolivia 1970 1998 29 8.36% 15.58%
Bulgaria 1991 2002 12 60.19% 18.55%
Canada 1963 1990 28 54.18% 17.59%
Chile 1963 1998 36 9.77% 21.15%
Colombia 1963 2000 38 22.81% 19.83%
Costa Rica 1963 1968 3 32.15% 22.35%
Cyprus 1971 2002 32 47.10% 15.65%
Finland 1963 2000 38 75.72% 24.69%
France 1977 2000 21 75.97% 14.40%
Hong Kong 1973 2002 30 94.39% 12.74%
Hungary 1970 2000 27 55.63% 22.99%
India 1977 2001 25 61.49% 15.70%
Indonesia 1970 2002 33 24.54% 16.72%
Iran 1963 2001 38 5.53% 9.92%
Ireland 1963 1991 29 59.51% 30.48%
Israel 1963 2001 39 81.25% --
Italy 1988 2000 12 84.58% 24.10%
Japan 1963 2000 38 94.00% 21.82%
Jordan 1974 2002 29 40.16% 13.34%
Kenya 1967 2002 36 19.37% 11.45%
Korea, Republic 1963 2001 39 83.68% 23.26%
Kuwait 1970 2001 32 19.99% 5.92%
Latvia 1997 1998 2 59.22% 26.65%
Luxembourg 1963 1992 30 84.64% 11.30%
Malaysia 1968 2001 33 40.02% 20.26%
Mexico 1970 2000 31 45.33% 21.30%
Morocco 1967 2001 22 36.28% 17.76%
Netherlands 1963 1993 31 59.74% 16.51%
Norway 1963 2001 39 37.60% 14.36%
Portugal 1971 2000 24 74.09% 17.66%
Senegal 1974 1997 20 24.71% 15.16%
Singapore 1963 2002 40 57.11% 26.05%
Slovenia 1990 2002 13 89.00% 27.91%
Spain 1964 2000 37 66.54% 17.04%
Sweden 1963 1987 25 77.38% 20.89%
Trinidad &Tobago 1966 1995 22 22.62% 8.92%
Tunisia 1963 2001 28 47.57% 14.00%
Turkey 1963 2000 38 44.60% 20.14%
United Kingdom 1963 2000 34 78.00% 23.17%
United States 1963 2001 38 71.32% 17.72%
Uruguay 1968 2000 26 35.40% 22.71%
Average for UNIDO Sample 53.33% 18.41%
World Average (including 
countries not in UNIDO 
sample)* 36.00% 14.68%
*Percentages reported from WDI data. 
**Total average of all 200 and 192 countries for exports and GDP, respectively, reported in the WDI.  
 